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Religion is a fundamental human concern. Recent psychological models of 
religion suggest that religious beliefs provide an external form of control. 
Independently, other research has found that increases in a sense of psychological 
control leads people to adopt riskier strategies. Hence, I hypothesized that if so, 
reminders of God would predict greater risk taking behavior. In three studies, I 
manipulated reminders of God using various means and found that such reminders 
lead people to take greater risks, as though people were literally ―taking a leap of 
faith.‖ My results are hence consistent with psychological models of religion but seem 
to contradict some survey research that has found more religious people to be less risk 
seeking. This inconsistency is addressed in the third study by looking at how religion, 
morality, norms, and risk taking are related. Implications to a relational schema 
approach to study the effects of God primes are discussed. In addition, the 






Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
―Once on the summit of Tryfan you will come to face to face with 
Adam and Eve. These two huge stone boulders top out on Tryfan's north 
summit and jumping from one to the other is a very brave and at the same time 
popular pastime. It is commonly known as the Leap of Faith. Urban legend 
says that those who jump the terrifying gap of around 4 feet at an altitude of 
3000ft is then proclaimed Freemen of Tryfan. You can't see on the photo but 
there's a sheer cliff on the back side and one small misstep would be quite 
tragic. It didn't seem to bother this climber as he did this a second time for me 
to record the action. I'm glad he made it - I would have felt somewhat off if he 
didn't.‖  
– Stephen Waterfall (see footnote 1) 
  
In many parts of the world, religion shapes how people behave, how they 
think about the world and their place in it. Central to the understanding of 
religion is the concept of deities—supernatural agents who are omninescent, 
omnipresent, and omnipotent. Yet, no one has ever seen them; they exist purely 
in our minds. I refer to these agents, irrespective of the empirical reality of their 
existence and their theistic origins, as ―God‖. If religion has a profound influence 
on the human condition, then it is logical that God, as one of the representative 
agents for religion, would likewise have a substantial impact at the individual 
level. In this research, I investigate how activating relational schemas of God 
influences an important behavior—risk taking. First, I give a brief overview of 
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the interplay between God, religion and humankind. Then, I attempt to show that 
at the individual level, people have relational schemas of God. Next, I review 
one prominent psychological model of religion—the compensatory control 
model of religion—that provides theoretical support for our key mediator, 
psychological control, that drives risk taking. Finally, I attempt to draw links that 
culminate in the main hypothesis that activating relational schemas of God 
increases risk taking. 
God, religion, and humankind 
People’s belief in Gods and other supernatural agents predate the 
formulation of religion—formal systems of beliefs involving the supernatural 
and its practices. Comparative religionists and anthropologists inform us that 
when looking at supernatural beliefs around the world, what is referred to as 
―God‖ includes many chimeras and other beings that derive from nonhuman 
things (Boyer, 2001). Mountains, rocks, rivers, trees, statues, and numerous other 
things that often bear little semblance to humans play critical roles in religious 
systems and are revered, worshipped, and feared.  
People act on their beliefs. Sometimes such beliefs subtly impact 
personal behaviour, such as an additional impetus to behave more morally 
(Darley & Batson, 1973), and sometimes these beliefs lead to tremendous 
behavioural displays and commitment of one’s resource (Atran, 2002). 
Ultimately, when patterns of these beliefs form a reasonably coherent web of 
meanings within a population of believers (Geertz, 1973), the belief in the 
supernatural becomes enshrined in formal systems in what is known as religion. 
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Almost all religious beliefs involve the supernatural (or what I loosely defined 
as God). The terms God and religion are not synonymous. For example, believing in 
God does not necessarily imply having a religion; but being religious implies 
believing in God.
2
 For example, people pray to God (but not religion) and view God 
(but not religion) as having the capability of punishing people for their misdeeds. 
Hence, I view God as an agent (a representative figure) of religion through which 
religion can actively exert its effects.  
God and religion dynamically exert their influence on humans and 
occupy a centrepiece in much of human history. Tales of human actions in the 
name of religion or God have been told through time, and many of these actions 
can still be observed in the modern day. The twin rocks, Adam and Eve, as 
described above seem to be another manifestation of religion’s powerful 
permeation into important aspects of human existence. Could it be that people 
are willing to risk their lives by leaping across the boulders because they are 
motivated by their real or imagined relationship with God? 
Relational schemas of God 
The relationship between God and humans can, to some extent, be 
conceptualized as any other human relationship (Kirkpatrick, 1999). Hence, to 
understand how the concept of God might affect human behaviour, it is useful to 
first consider how relationships are encoded in memory. Baldwin (1992) 
proposed the concept of relational schemas to account for how relationships and 
their effects are represented in memory. According to Baldwin (1992), people 
organize their interpersonal experiences into working models in memory. These 
models are hypothesized to include schemas of the self and others. When mental 
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representations of relationship figures are activated consciously or 
nonconsciously, the psychological presence of that person is activated and people 
may think, feel and act as though the relationship figure is physically there. For 
example, researchers have found that when relational schemas of one’s mother, 
colleague or friend were activated, people behaved in line with what the 
respective relationship figure would have expected them to do (Fitzsimons & 
Bargh, 2003).  
Although relational schemas have traditionally been investigated in the 
realm of interpersonal relationships, it need not be restricted to human-human 
relationships. Baldwin’s (1992) conceptualization of relational schemas is broad 
enough to encompass people’s relationship with nonhuman entities, like God as I 
investigate here. Furthermore, several researchers have noted that some 
individuals possess a personal relationship with God like the ones shared with 
human attachment figures (see Granqvist, Mikulincer, & Shaver, 2010, for a 
review). According to Kirkpatrick (1999), these individuals would display 
classic attachment responses with God, such as separation anxiety and a desire 
for closeness. For example, when primed with words related to separation from 
their mothers and God, believers demonstrate a greater desire for closeness to 
their mothers and God to the same extent (Birgegard & Granqvist, 2004).  
If people have relational schemas of God, then priming God (i.e., 
activating relational schemas of God) should influence people’s affect, cognition 
and behavior. Several research provided some examples of this. According to 
Baldwin, Carrel and Lopez (1992), Catholic women subliminally exposed to a 
photograph of the Pope after reading a passage describing sexual pleasure 
displayed lower self-concepts, compared to those exposed to a photograph of a 
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stranger. More recently, Sharif and Norenzayan (2007) primed people with 
religious concepts and found that it increased prosocial behaviour. In a recent 
investigation (Dijksterhuis, Preston, Wegner, & Aarts, 2008), participants who 
were specifically primed with the word ―God‖ while engaging in a competitive 
task with the computer felt less responsible for their own performance than those 
who were primed with the word ―computer‖. 
The current thesis aimed to extend this line of research by examining the 
effect of exposing people to God-related primes on how much risk they are 
willing to take. To my best knowledge, this issue has not been examined in past 
studies. Second, although there had been several studies that examined the 
effects of God-related primes, most of these studies were vague about exactly 
what constructs that were being primed. For example, it is not clear if exposing 
people to photographs of the Pope (Baldwin et al. 1992), religion-related words 
(e.g., holy, divine, pious, God, religion, etc.; Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 
2003; McKay, Efferson, & Fehr, 2010; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007), religious 
paintings (Weisbuch-Remington, Mendes, Seery, & Blascovitch, 2005), or 
having participants recite the Ten Commandments (Mazar et al., 2008), bible 
verses (Carpenter & Marshall, 2009), or saying prayers (Lambert, Fincham, 
Braithwaite, Graham, Beach, 2009; Lambert, Fincham, Stillman, Graham, Beach, 
2010), would prime God, religion, moral codes, afterlife, etc. To my knowledge, 
only one study (Dijksterhuis et al., 2008) specifically activated the concept of 
God by exposing participants to the word ―God‖. This research is the first 
attempt aimed at understanding the effect on risk taking that the activation of the 
concept of God could have.   
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Psychological control as one of the functions of religion 
Because God can be an agent of religion through which religion influences 
individuals, it is useful to consult psychological models of religion about the effects of 
priming God although God and religion may not be the same thing. Batson and Stocks 
(2004) postulated that one reason why religion is so prevalent across humanity and 
time is because it fulfils basic psychological needs. One function that religion serves 
is that it imbues believers with a sense of control in a world that is seemingly filled 
with randomness and chaos. This view is similar to those expounded by religion 
scholars of different scholarly traditions (e.g., Berger, 1967; Freud, 1927; Rutjens, 
van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2010) but empirical evidence remained scarce until 
only recently.  
The compensatory control model of religion
3
 (Kay, Shepherd, Blatz, Chua, & 
Galinsky, 2010) postulates religion as an external source of control that serves to 
compensate for chaos in one’s internal life (see also Malinowsky, 1948). In a series of 
studies, Kay et al. (2010) demonstrated that people increased their belief in a 
controlling God (i.e., a God that creates order) but not a creationist God when events 
in one’s life seemed uncertain. Note that it is not the case that beliefs in God increased 
indiscriminately following feelings of uncertainty, but rather this increase was only 
specific to a God that people believed creates order. For example, one longitudinal 
study, Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan, and Laurin (2008) measured voter’s beliefs in 
God before and after a major election, which served as a naturalistic manipulation of 
psychological control. They found that voters believed more in a controlling God (vs. 
a creationist God) two weeks before the election (low control) as compared to two 
weeks after (high control).  
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In another set of studies, Kay, Moscovitch and Laurin (2010) primed 
participants with randomness-related words (e.g., chance, random) and found that 
randomness led to significantly stronger beliefs in the existence of supernatural 
sources of control compared to those primed with negative valenced words unrelated 
to randomness. If beliefs in a controlling God help to cope with uncertainty, it could 
also mean that exposure to reminders of God might alleviate stress responses, and that 
is consistent with what Inzlicht and Tullett (2010) found. In their study, participants 
who wrote about religion displayed lower neurophysiological indicators of stress 
when mistakes were committed in an error-prone Stroop task. It has also been found 
that in conditions of stress, neural activity in the anterior cingulated cortex—a cortical 
region involved in anxiety responses—were lower (signalling lower anxiety responses) 
in believers than non-believers (Inzlicht, McGregor, Hirsh, & Nash, 2009).  
Therefore, it is clear that people draw from religion a source of control derived 
from God, and this is especially so in times of uncertainty. Uncertainty is one of the 
main features of any risky activity (Yates & Stone, 1992). Hence, reminding people of 
God should affect risk taking. In the next section, I review literature examining 
psychological control and risk taking with the aim of making specific predictions. 
Psychological control and risk taking 
A number of studies have shown that greater psychological control has a 
facilitative effect on risk taking (Kray, Paddock, & Galinsky, 2008; Nordgren, van der 
Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2007). In one research (Horswill & McKenna, 1999), control 
was manipulated by having participants imagined that they were either drivers (high 
control) or passengers (low control). It was found that participants who were in 
control (drivers) were more comfortable with higher levels of risks (e.g., high driving 
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speeds, shorter gap acceptance and following distance, more dangerous overtaking, 
etc.) than controls (passengers).  
In another research, Davis, Sundahl, and Lesbo (2000) investigated how 
experiencing an illusion of control—the tendency for people to overestimate their 
ability to control external events (Langer, 1975)—influenced real-life risk taking. 
According to Davis et al. (2000), casino gamblers playing craps placed higher and 
more ―difficult‖ bets on their own rolls (high illusion of control) than on other 
patron’s rolls (low illusion of control).  Other researchers (Anderson & Galinsky, 
2006) have manipulated psychological control via a sense of personal power and 
found high power individuals to exhibit greater risk taking as measured by a variety of 
indicators—having unprotected sex, divulging interests during negotiations and risk 
perception. 
In addition, the terror management perspective (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & 
Solomon, 1998) suggests that the enhancement of self-esteem gives an illusion of 
control over one’s finitude. Accordingly, Ben-Ari, Florian, and Mikulincer (1999) 
found that mortality salience promoted greater driving risks among drivers who 
perceived driving to be important to their self-esteem. Thus, converging evidence 
strongly supports the idea that feeling a sense of psychological control predisposes 
people to engage in greater risk taking behaviors. 
The present research 
From the review above, it is clear that religion impacts individuals in various 
ways and one of which is that it imbues people with a greater sense of control. This, 
in turn, may lead them to be more venturesome and daring to take risks. Hence, the 
main hypothesis is that exposure to God primes will increase risk taking.  
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The main hypothesis was tested in three experiments. In this research, the 
intention was to activate individuals’ relational schema of God by priming only God 
and observe its effects on risk taking, which was measured using a well-validated 
behavioral task—the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002). Study 
1 provided the first test of this hypothesis by activating God concepts nonconsciously 
using subliminal God primes (the word ―God‖) and examining its effects on risk 
taking. Study 2 aimed to replicate Study 1 but with several modifications. First, to 
extend the ecological validity of the findings, supraliminal primes that resemble 
everyday objects were used to prime God. Second, and more importantly, Study 2 was 
aimed at finding evidence that psychological control is a mediator of the effects of 
God primes on risk taking. Finally, Study 3 addressed an apparent contradiction 
between the current prediction and survey findings that have found a negative 
correlation between religiosity and risk taking behaviors.  
In all three studies, I also explored if trait religiosity might moderate the effect 
of God primes on risk taking. Research has found effects of relationship primes to 
vary as a function of trait relationship variables such as relationship closeness (e.g., 
Shah & Kruglanski, 2003). Hence, if God can be treated as one of a person’s many 
relationship figures (Kirkpatrick, 1999), it is possible that the effect of God primes 
might be moderated by trait religiousity variables; i.e., those who are more religious 
(e.g., hold strong beliefs about God and engage in religion-related practices) might be 
most affected by God primes. However, research examining the effects of God or 
religion priming has not yielded a definitive answer to whether trait religiosity might 
moderate the effects of God or religion primes. Six studies priming either God or 
religion have found no moderating effects of trait religiosity (using a variety of 
different measures) on dependent variables such as submissiveness (Saroglou, 
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Corneille, & Van Cappellen, 2009), prosociality (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007), 
awarding punishment for transgressors (McKay et al., 2010), honesty (Randolph-Seng, 
& Nielsen, 2007), spatial attention (Chasteen, Burdzy, & Pratt, 2010) and gratitude 
(Lambert et al., 2009). Yet, there are other studies that have found religiosity to be a 
moderator of God or religion priming effects dependent variables such as self-
evaluation (Baldwin et al., 1990), moral hypocrisy (Carpenter & Marshall, 2009), 
sense of authorship (Dijksterhuis et al., 2008), stress responses (Inzlicht & Tullett, 
2010; Weisbuch-Remington et al., 2005), and humor (Saroglou & Jaspard, 2001). 
Given the mixed evidence with regard to the moderating role of religiosity in past 
God-prime studies, it would be indefensible to make a clear prediction on whether 
religiosity would moderate the effects of God primes on risk taking. Hence, trait 
religiosity (using a variety of indicators) was examined as moderator only for 
exploratory purposes.  
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Chapter 2: Study 1 - Does the phenomenon exist? 
 
Study 1 provided the first test of the hypothesis that people tend to take more 
risks when they are exposed to God primes. Participants were subliminally primed 
with either the words God, Dad or Water and afterward engaged in a task that 
measured risk taking.  
Two control primes were used to compare the effect of the God primes on risk 
taking. The word Water served as the neutral baseline prime. The word Dad was used 
as a control prime to rule out two alternative explanations. First, it is possible that 
priming God would co-activate a father-like relational schema that is observed among 
some religions (Freud, 1927) thereby activating relational schemas of fathers rather 
than representations related to God, which in turn affected risk taking. Second, 
because God can function as a secure attachment figure (Granqvist, Mikulincer, & 
Shaver, 2010), it is possible that priming God may activate a sense of security that 
encourages exploratory and even risky behaviors (see Feeny & Collins, 2004). 
Because past research has demonstrated that priming people with their fathers 
activated a sense of attachment security (Mikulincer et al., 2001), if the God primes 
lead to higher risk taking than the Dad primes, it would suggest that the effect of the 
God primes cannot be solely explained by the activation of fatherly or attachment 






Participants were 172 National University of Singapore (NUS) undergraduates 
(Mage = 20.1; SDage = 1.31; 46 males, 123 females, 3 did not provide gender 
information) who took part for course credits. Their religious affiliations can be found 
in Table 1. They were randomly assigned to be primed with the words God (God 
condition; n = 62), Water (Water condition; n = 54), or Dad (Dad condition; n = 56).  
Procedure 
 Participants were tested in groups of one to eight. Upon arrival, they were led 
to their individual cubicles. They were given written instructions concerning the 
BART, which was presented as a ―Balloon Game.‖ Participants first went through 10 
trials of the BART as practice. The practice trials preceded the priming procedure 
because if the practice trials were presented after the priming procedure, the effects of 
the primes might have diminished considerably by the time participants started on the 
main trials. Hence, the practice trials were administered first, followed by the priming 
procedure, and then the main trials of the BART. Headphones were worn to minimize 
external disturbances. After the practice trials, participants performed a circle-
detection task which in actual fact served as a cover for the subliminal priming 
procedure. At the start of each trial, a fixation cross (+) was presented for 1000ms at 
the center of the screen, which was immediately followed by the prime. The prime 
was presented at the center of the screen for 17ms, followed by a mask that consisted 
of a string of Xs which was presented for 50ms. A circle then appeared either on the 
left or right of the screen and participants had to indicate as quickly as possible by 
19 
 
pressing z or m on the keyboard, if the circle appeared on the left or right respectively. 
After participants made their responses the circle was removed and the whole 
sequence repeated again for 60 times. Thereafter, they completed 30 main trials of the 
BART where scores for risk taking were taken for analyses. Subsequently, they filled 
in religiosity measures, demographic (age and gender). Lastly, funnel debriefing was 
conducted where participants were first asked broad open-ended questions (―Did you 
see any words/letters being flashed on screen‖, ―Were the tasks were related in any 
way,‖ etc.), down to the specific questions (e.g., ―There was a word flashed on screen. 
What do you think it was?‖) where the aims of the research were gradually revealed.  
The debriefing showed that no one saw the primes, nor suspected a link between the 
tasks. Finally, they were thanked and debriefed. 
Measures 
Risk taking. The BART is a computer program that simulates real-world risk 
taking and involves participants administering pumps to a series of virtual balloons 
over multiple trials. On each trial, a balloon would be presented on the computer 
screen and participants had to pump the balloon by clicking a virtual pump. They 
were told that each time they pumped the balloon without bursting it, they would earn 
one cent and that the more pumps they gave, the more money they would accumulate. 
But if the balloon exploded, they would lose the money they had earned on that trial 
(money earned from previous trials would be unaffected). At any time, they could 
choose bank in their earnings at any time by hitting a ―Collect $$$‖ button. The 
number of pumps needed to burst the balloon on any particular trial was randomly set 
between 1-128 pumps. Because the explosion threshold for each trial was not revealed 
to the participants and is randomly determined by the BART program, any additional 
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pump is given at the risk of losing the monetary gains. In this way, the BART 
provides a measure of risk taking. 
Following Lejuez et al. (2002), risk taking (i.e., BART) scores were computed 
by averaging the number of pumps on trials in which the balloons did not explode. 
Higher BART scores reflect greater risk taking. This index was more appropriate than 
averaging the number of pumps across all 30 trials which might not accurately reflect 
the participants’ willingness to take risk. For example, a balloon on a particular trial 
might burst on the 10
th
 pump but the participant might have intended to pump that 
balloon 20 times. Because the balloon in this case would have exploded before the 
full extent of the participant’s inclination for risk taking was revealed, computing 
these ten trials into the final risk taking index would have underestimated this 
participant’s risk taking tendency. As such, merely computing the responses made 
across all 30 trials would provide an overly conservative measure of risk taking (see 
also Wallsten, Pleskac, & Lejuez, 2005, for a discussion).  
Intrinsic/extrinsic-Revised (I/E-R) religiosity scale (Gorsuch & 
McPherson, 1989). The I/E-R religiosity scale has 14 items that measure two 
orthogonal orientations towards religiosity. Intrinsic religiosity regards religion as an 
end, where individuals value religion for what it is. In contrast, extrinsic religiosity 
regards religion as a means, where individuals view religion as what they can obtain 
from it. Sample items for the intrinsic factor include ―I enjoy reading about my 
religion,‖ ―I try hard to live all my life according to my religious beliefs,‖ and those 
for the extrinsic factor include ―I go to church mostly to spend time with my friends,‖ 
and ―Prayer is for peace and happiness,‖ etc. The word ―church‖ in some items (e.g., 
―I go to church mainly to spend time with my friends‖) was replaced with ―[a] place(s) 
of worship‖ to make it applicable to non-Christian/Catholic participants. Participants 
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answered the items on 5-point scales from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). 
The reliability for the intrinsic (α = .81) and extrinsic (α = .87) facets were good. 
Therefore, an average score for each facet was computed. 
Results  
Manipulation check 
All participants were clearly attentive to the priming task as their responses to 
the spatial locations of the circles were 99.2% correct. None of the participants 
reported seeing any words during the subliminal priming procedure. 
Main analyses 
I examined how the primes would influence risk taking and whether their 
effects were moderated by intrinsic and/or extrinsic religiosity. First, scores for the 
intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity facet scale were centered. Next, because the prime 
has three levels, two dummy variables, D1 and D2, were created. The God condition 
was designated as the base group and was coded as 0. In D1 and D2, the Water and 
Dad condition were coded as 1.
4
 Next, the interaction terms with each dummy 
variable were computed. Thereafter, the dummy variables and centered religiosity 
scores were entered in step 1 of a hierarchical regression model and the interaction 
terms were entered in step 2 of the model.  
Scores for intrinsic (uncentered M = 3.81, SD = 1.06) and extrinsic religiosity 
(uncentered M = 4.04, SD = 1.29) were analysed in two separate hierarchical 
regression models.
5
 In the first hierarchical regression model where intrinsic 
religiosity and prime were used as predictors (see Table 3), there was a main effect of 
intrinsic religiosity (B = 2.58, t = 2.72, p = .007) which showed that intrinsically 
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oriented individuals were inclined to take more risks. Importantly, participants primed 
with God took more risks than those primed with Water (B = -5.00, t = 2.05, p = .04) 
or Dad (B = -5.89, t = 2.43, p = .02). Means are displayed in Fig. 1. There was, 
however, no evidence that intrinsic religiosity moderated the effects of D1 (B = 3.63, t 
= 1.47, p = .15), and D2 (B = 1.48, t = .66, p = .51) 
In the second hierarchical regression model where extrinsic religiosity and 
prime were used as predictors (see Table 3), there was no main effect of extrinsic 
religiosity (B = .84, t = 1.06, p = .29), and again, participants primed with God took 
more risks than those primed with Water (B = -4.79, t = 1.93, p = .05) or Dad (B = -
6.22, t = 2.52, p = .01). There was, however, no moderating effects of extrinsic 
religiosity (D1 with God condition: B = 3.59, t = 1.83, p = .07; D2 with God condition: 
B = .82, t = .43, p = .67). 
Discussion  
The results provide preliminary evidence that nonconscious primes of God 
increases risk taking. Compared to two neutral control primes (Water and Dad), 
subliminal God primes increased risk taking. Importantly, there is evidence that the 
effect of the God prime on risk taking could not be explained by activation of 
concepts related to fathers or attachment-related security because those in the God 
condition took greater risks than those in the Dad condition. Individuals who were 
intrinsically oriented towards religion took more risks. However, there was no 
moderating influence of intrinsic or extrinsic religiosity. Many measurements of 
religiosity have been published (see Hill & Hood, 1999) and it is possible that the I/E-
R religiosity scale which tapped into motivations for believing (Gorsuch & 
McPherson, 1989) did not capture other important facets of religiosity (e.g., the 
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degree people believe in God and the function of religion) to reveal the moderation. 
Hence, in the next study, in addition to marshalling evidence for the postulated 
mediator, psychological control, the measurement of religiosity was replaced with 
another measure of religiosity. 
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Chapter 3: Study 2 - Explaining the phenomenon 
 
Study 2 was conducted for several reasons. First, Study 1 used a subliminal 
God prime in which the word God was flashed subliminally. In Study 2, I examined 
the ecological validity of the findings by using supraliminal primes. Hence, 
participants were exposed to a stack of papers that resembles advertisement brochures, 
an object that participants would encounter on a typical day.  
Second, as reviewed in the Introduction, one of the important functions that 
religion serves is that it imbues people with a sense of control, and if so, priming God 
would indirectly lead to greater risk taking. The purpose of this study is to examine 
the validity of this causal chain. Rather than examining this causal chain via statistical 
mediation methods, the proposed mediator, psychological control, was experimentally 
manipulated. (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). Such ―manipulation-of-process 
design‖ is a theory-driven approach and is recommended whenever possible because 
it offers unique advantages over statistical mediation analysis in claiming for causality 
(see Spencer et al., 2005). Confidence in mediation is found when the experimental 
manipulation of the mediator changes the effect of the independent variable on the 
dependent variable in ways consistent with a priori theorizing.  
In this study, participants were primed with either God or a neutral stimuli 
(water). Among those primed with God, a second manipulation followed that was 
designed to disable the enhanced psychological control that would have otherwise 
resulted from being just exposed to God primes alone. Specifically, for those primed 
with God, half were made to feel low in control and the results were compared with 
the other half whose sense of psychological control was not manipulated. It was ideal 
to have another comparison condition group where participants who were primed with 
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neutral (water) stimuli had to write about an event matched on negative valence 
(blood donation) to ensure that any differences within the God conditions were not the 
result of participants simply being distracted by a subsequent essay-writing task. 
Blood donation was chosen to control for valence to ascertain that any effects 
observed among those whose sense of control was lowered was not due to the 
negativity associated with low control. Hence there were three conditions (i.e., God-
Low Control, God-Neutral Control, and Water-Neutral Control) and these three 
conditions are sufficient in testing the causal chain (see Shrout & Bolger, 2002); a 
complete 2 (Prime: God vs. Water) × 2 (Psychological control: Low vs. Neutral) is 
not necessary. Thereafter, risk taking was measured using the BART. Two predictions 
were made. First, when people’s sense of psychological control was not manipulated, 
those primed with God would take greater risks than those primed with neutral stimuli. 
Second, individuals primed with God but felt low in control would take less risk than 
individuals primed with God but had not been made to feel low in control.  
The social axiom religiosity subscale (Leung & Bond, 2004), was used to 
examine if religiosity would moderate the God-risk taking effect. Social axioms are 
general, context-free beliefs that people acquire about their world as a result of 
socialization.The religiosity subscale measures the extent to which people believe in 
the existence of supernatural forces and the beneficial functions of religious belief. 
Because people derive a sense of control from religion (Kay et al., 2008), it is possible 
that functionalist beliefs in religion would moderate the main effect of priming God 





Participants were 138 NUS undergraduates comprising 50 males and 84 
females (4 did not provide information on gender) who participated in exchange for 
course credits. Mean age was 21.0 (SD = 1.62). Information about their religious 
affiliations is reported in Table 1. Participants were randomly assigned to the God and 
Water condition. Within the God condition, half were randomly assigned to be 
induced to feel low in control (Low Control condition) or not (Neutral Control 
condition). Hence the sample consisted of n = 43 in the God-Low Control condition, n 
= 55 in the God-Neutral Control condition, and n = 40 in the Water-Neutral Control 
condition.  
Procedure 
 Participants were ushered to their individual cubicles. Apart from standard 
computer equipment (mouse, keyboard, monitor), an additional stack of papers had 
been placed at the corner of each cubicle, and the top sheet of the stack read either 
―The Nature of God‖ (God condition) or ―The Nature of Water‖ (Water condition). 
These papers were presented as innocuous everyday objects and were in participants’ 
peripheral vision field. It was neither explicitly pointed out nor did participants 
questioned about the purpose of the stack of papers. All participants reported in the 
post-experimental debrief that they saw the stack of papers but were unaware of its 
influence on themselves. 
Like Study 1, participants began with a 10-balloon practice trial of BART. 
When the trials ended, they were asked to write an essay. Those in the God condition 
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were instructed to write an essay describing either a time in their lives where they felt 
low in control (God-Low Control condition) or their experiences with blood donation 
(God-Neutral Control condition). Those in the Water condition wrote about their 
experiences with blood donation (Water-Neutral Control condition). Participants then 
attempted a 30-balloon BART as the main trials. Thereafter, they filled in 
questionnaires that gathered information on their demographics, religiosity, and 
suspicion checks. Finally, they were funnel debriefed (which revealed that no one 
suspected that the stack of papers influenced their performance in BART, nor 
suspected that the tasks were connected) and thanked. 
Pretest for psychological control manipulation. The manipulation check 
items for the psychological control manipulation were not presented within the main 
experimental session as existing research suggests that doing so may compromise the 
integrity of key dependent variables (Kuhnen, 2010). If the checks were made before 
the main BART, it may unintentionally increase psychological control among those in 
the Water condition because they would be primed by the control-related words in the 
items, thereby contaminating the risk taking scores for that group. If the checks were 
made after the main BART, the effect of the psychological control manipulation may 
have worn off by then. Hence, the manipulation was pretested in a separate sample of 
31 NUS undergraduates. These participants rated five items measuring psychological 
control ( = .72) after describing a low control incident (n = 14) or a blood donation 
incident (n = 17). The items, rated on a 5-point scale from 1 (Strongly disbelieve) to 5 
(Strongly believe), were: ―I am responsible for most of the things that happen to me‖, 
―I feel that I am in control of my own life‖, ―I feel that I don't have enough control 
over the direction my life is taking‖, ―There really is no such thing as luck‖ and ―I feel 
that what happens in my life is chiefly controlled by powerful others‖. We composed 
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the first two items and the rest were adopted from Rotter (1966; next two items) and 
Levenson (1981; last item). 
The manipulation checks for the psychological control manipulation indicated 
that participants in the Low Control condition (M = 2.99, SD = .74) indeed reported 
feeling a lower sense of control than those in the neutral control condition (M = 3.80, 
SD = .41), t(29) = 3.87, p = .001. Participants in both conditions did not differ in 
terms of how negative they felt as measured by four negative affect items (―How 
fearful / sad / upset / negative are you feeling now?‖), all ps > .46, thus indicating that 
both conditions were equal in negative valence.  
Measures 
Risk taking. The BART was used in the same way as in Study 1. 
Social axioms religiosity subscale. The social axioms questionnaire (Leung 
& Bond, 2004) has five subscales (e.g., social cynicism, effort-outcome expectancies, 
etc.) of which only the religiosity subscale was used. The religiosity subscale has 12 
items, which included items such as: ―There is a supreme being controlling the 
universe‖, ―Belief in a religion makes people good citizens‖, ―Ghosts or spirits are 
people’s fantasy‖, etc. Participants responded on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 
(Strongly disbelieve) to 5 (Strongly believe). The subscale was reliable (α = .77) and 
the average score was computed as a composite measure of religiosity. 
Results 
Main analyses 
Means are plotted in Fig. 2. A one-way ANOVA showed a significant 
difference in risk taking across the three conditions, F(2, 137) = 4.05, p = .02 , η = .04. 
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Subsequent posthoc Tukey analyses revealed that under conditions when their sense 
of control was not lowered, those primed with God exhibited significantly more risk 
taking than those primed with water (p = .05), and thus replicated the main finding in 
Study 1. However, among those primed with God, those made to feel low in control 
displayed less risk taking than those not made to feel low in control (p = .04), and in 
fact, to similar levels as those who were not primed with God (p = .99).  
Next, religiosity was examined if it would moderate the main findings. There 
was no reason to include the God-Low Control condition for the purpose of testing 
this moderation because the religiosity variables were included only to test for 
moderation effects on the main effect, which is the effect of God prime versus control 
prime on risk taking. Hence, only the cells from the Neutral Control condition were 
used, where the God and Water conditions were coded as 1 and 0, respectively. 
Subsequently, the social axioms religiosity subscale scores were centered (uncentered 
M = 3.33, SD = .58) and the interaction term was computed. Next, Prime and the 
interaction term were entered in step 1 and 2, respectively, in a hierarchical regression 
model. The results of the regression model (see Table 4) revealed no main effect of 
religiosity, B = 2.76, t = .85, p = .40, and no evidence of moderation as the interaction 
term was nonsignificant, B = -1.07, t = .16, p = .87. 
Discussion 
Like in Study 1, when individuals’ psychological control was not manipulated, 
those primed with God took more risks than those primed with a neutral stimulus. 
This occurred with a different type of prime from that in Study 1, thus suggesting the 
robustness and ecological validity of the findings.  In addition, among those exposed 
to the God primes, those who felt low in psychological control took fewer risks than 
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those whose sense of psychological control were not manipulated. The pattern of 
results suggests that when relational schemas of God were activated, people felt a 
greater sense of psychological control, which in turn droves risk seeking behaviour. 
Deliberately inducing a feeling of low psychological control negated any feelings of 
high control that resulted from being primed with God to levels almost equivalent to 
those who were not primed with God. Again, although a different facet of religiosity 
was examined as a potential moderator, there was still no evidence of moderation.  
Although the main finding that God primes lead to greater risk taking was 
replicated, the main finding does not corroborate with similar lines of research that 
have found a negative correlation between religiosity and risk taking. This apparent 




Chapter 4: Study 3 - Resolving an apparent contradiction 
 
Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that priming people with God led people to take 
greater risks. Also, in Study 1, people who were higher in intrinsic religiosity 
exhibited higher risk taking tendencies. These findings contradict some correlational 
studies which have found a negative correlation between religiosity and various risk 
taking behaviors. For example, more religious individuals have a tendency to be less 
involved in criminal activities (Abar, Carter, & Winsler, 2009), unprotected casual sex 
(Poulson, Eppler, Satterwhite, Wuensch, & Bass, 1998), substance abuse (Kerestes, 
Youniss, & Metz, 2004; Sinha, Cnaan, & Gelles, 2007), gambling (Diaz, 2000), and 
have more conservative attitudes towards risks (Hoffman & Miller, 1995; McNamara, 
Burns, Johnson, & McCorkle, 2010). While these findings were mainly from Western 
countries, similar patterns have also been found in Taiwan (Liu, 2010). These studies 
measured religiosity as traits. In cognitive terms, traits are measures of chronic 
accessibility while states are levels of current accessibility (Higgins, 1996). Hence, as 
a trait, religiosity would exert its influences in the same way that would be expected 
by priming God. Thus, priming God, which momentarily increases accessibility of 
God concepts, should have led to a decrease in risk taking behavior but the opposite 
was found in Studies 1 and 2. 
I hypothesize a crucial difference that can account for the inconsistency 
between Studies 1 and 2 and the survey literature lies in the risk taking behaviors 
examined. The survey literature that examined the relationships between religiosity 
and risk behaviors assessed risk behaviors such as casual sex without condoms 
(Murray, Ciarrocchi, Murray-Swank, 2007; Poulson et al., 1998), earlier sexual 
experiences (Woody, Russel, D’Souza, & Woody, 2000), extramarital sex (Gore & 
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Yeatman, 2005), criminal offences (Abar et al., 2009), substance abuse (Kerestes et 
al., 2004), gambling (Diaz, 2000), etc., all of which inherently have moral 
underpinnings.
6
 In contrast, in Studies 1 and 2, the risk taking measure, BART, was 
always introduced in morally neutral terms as a ―balloon game‖, and money, the 
reward for performance in the BART, has no inherent moral connotations. To clarify, 
while it is true that risk taking varies with the domain of risk taking (Weber, Blais, & 
Betz, 2006), the point is not that people primed with God would show different risk 
taking patterns depending on the domains of risk taking. Rather, it is whether the 
domain of risk taking has an inherent moral injunction.
7
 I hypothesize that when 
moral injunctions involving BART are invoked, people will take less risk when 
primed with God.  
To test this proposition, some participants were supraliminally primed with 
either God or a control prime, in the same way as Study 2. The control prime used in 
this study was one related to fairies. People believe in a variety of supernatural agents 
such as aliens, ancestors, devil, angels, etc. (Boyer, 2001) and it is possible that the 
main results could be due to an activation of a general concept of a supernatural figure 
rather than God specifically. Hence, fairy primes were chosen as the comparison 
group to control for the element of ―supernaturalness‖ of the God primes. To associate 
the act of taking risks with morality, participants were then led to believe that there 
would be future immoral (or amoral) consequences implicated with one’s 
performance in BART. Thereafter, participants attempted BART, followed by several 
questionnaires. It is possible that the measures of religiosity were overly specific in 
the past two studies. Hence, general trait religiosity measures of trait religiosity were 





Participants were 142 NUS undergraduates (Mage = 21.1; SDage = 1.53; 55 
males) who took part for course credits. Their religious affiliations are reported in 
Table 1. Participants were randomly assigned to the cells of a 2 (Prime: God vs. Fairy) 
× 2 (Moral injunction: Greed vs. Neutral). The sample consisted of n = 33 in the God-
Greed, n = 33 in the God-Neutral, n = 38 in the Fairy-Greed, and n = 38 in the Fairy-
Neutral conditions.  
Procedure 
 Participants were led to their individual cubicles where, similar to Study 2, 
there was either a folder that read ―The Nature of God‖ (God condition) or ―The 
Nature of Fairies‖ (Fairy condition) at the corner of their desk. Like in Study 2, all 
participants reported in the post-experimental debrief that they noticed the stack of 
papers but were unaware of its influence. 
Participants started with a 10-balloon trial of the BART like in Studies 1 and 2. 
Next, they read an article designed to invoke moral injunctions against taking risks. 
Participants in the Greed condition read an article that denounced the accumulation of 
wealth and were led to believe how the performance on the ―balloon game‖ had been 
found to predict one’s tendency to commit crimes related to money (e.g., cheating 
insurance companies)—negative and immoral consequences. Participants in the 
Neutral condition read an article that describes the toxicity of water when 
overconsumed and were led to believe that performance on the BART predicts how 
much water one drinks, and hence one’s chances of suffering from certain medical 
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problems (e.g., kidney stones)—negative but amoral consequences. Hence, negativity 
was controlled for as both groups were presented with negative information on what 
their performance in BART predicts. To make the article more persuasive and 
credible (Hovland & Weiss, 1951), participants were told that the findings were from 
a scientific expert, a (fictitious) Professor Higgins. Subsequently, they attempted 30 
balloons of the actual BART, and then a series of manipulation and suspicion checks, 
as well as religiosity and demographic items. Suspicion checks revealed that no one 
could guess the hypothesis nor suspected the stack of papers influenced their 
performance in BART. Lastly, they were thanked and debriefed.  
Measures 
Risk taking. Risk taking was computed in the same way as described in 
Studies 1 and 2.  
Religiosity. Participants’ general levels of religiosity were obtained by asking 
them to rate on 7-point scales ―How religious are you?‖ (1 = Not religious; 7 = Very 
religious), ―How important is religion to your identity?‖ (1 = Not important; 7 = Very 
important), and the following items on a that ranged from 1 (To a small extent) to 7 
(To a large extent): ―To what extent do you practice the requirements of your (or any) 
religion/faith?‖, ―To what extent do you feel close to your (or any) god?‖, ―To what 
extent do you believe in the teachings of your (or any) religion/faith?‖ and ―To what 
extent does religion influence your actions and decisions?‖ The reliability of these six 
items was excellent (α = .97) and the average was used as the measure of general trait 
religiosity. 
Manipulation checks for moral injunction. Participants were assessed if the 
manipulation resulted in them perceiving the desire for excessive money (i.e., greed) 
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as more morally wrong. Participants were asked about their moral attitudes towards 
six issues (premarital sex, feeling jealous at friend’s success, eating meat, skipping 
classes, being late for appointments, and being greedy about money). The items were 
phrased ―To me, [issue] is…‖, and responses were made on 7-point scales from 1 
(morally wrong) to 7 (morally right). Only the item related to greed was of interest in 
this manipulation check. In addition, participants were also assessed if they believed 
the negative consequences that were implied in their performance in BART would 
apply to themselves. Specifically, they were asked ―To what extent do you think 
Professor Higgin’s predictions will apply to you?‖ and rated this item on a 7-point 
scale from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (To a large extent).  
Results  
Manipulation check for moral injunction 
Participants who read the passage about greed indeed felt that being greedy 
was more morally wrong (M = 4.71; SD = 1.33) compared with those who read the 
passage about water, (M = 3.42; SD = 1.25), t(141) = 2.49, p = .02. In addition, those 
who read about greed felt that the scientific predictions would apply to them (M = 
3.32; SD = 1.33) to the same extent as those who read the passage about water (M = 
3.59; SD = 1.35), t(141) = 1.18, p = .24. Together, these checks indicated that the 
moral injunction manipulation was successful and that participants, regardless of 
whether they read about greed or water, believed the negative consequences 




Two sets of dummy coded variables were created, one for Prime (coded as 
God = 1, Fairy = 0) and one for Moral injunction (coded as Greed = 1, Neutral = 0). 
Religiosity scores were centered (uncentered M = 3.80, SD = 1.71) and the interaction 
terms were then computed. In a hierarchical regression model, prime, moral 
injunction and the centered religiosity were entered in step 1, followed by the three 
two-way interaction terms in step 2, and one three-way interaction term in step 3 (see 
Table 5). In step 3, the Prime × Moral injunction × Religiosity interaction (B = 3.95, t 
= 1.38, p = .17) was not significant. An examination of the lower order effects in step 
2 revealed that the Prime × Religiosity (B = .39, t = 1.81, p = .79), and Moral 
injunction × Religiosity (B = -2.60, t = 1.81, p = .07) interactions were not significant, 
but as predicted, the Prime × Moral injunction interaction was significant, B = -16.37, 
t = 3.37, p = .001. There were no main effects of Prime (B = .23, t = .09, p = .93), 
Moral injunction (B = -3.55, t = 1.45, p = .15) or Religiosity (B = -.01, t = .02, p = .99) 
in step 1. 
Mean BART scores of the Prime × Moral injunction interaction are plotted in 
Fig. 3. Simple effects analyses revealed that in the absence of moral injunctions, 
individuals primed with God took more risks than those primed with fairies, F(1, 138) 
= 4.07, p = .05, η = .03. This replicated our main findings in Studies 1 and 2. Notably, 
comparing our effects of God with Fairy primes ruled out that our effects were due to 
―supernaturalness.‖ However, when moral injunctions were invoked, individuals 
primed with God displayed less risk taking tendencies than those primed with Fairy, 
F(1, 138) = 4.66, p = .03, η = .03. This finding mirrors correlational studies of 
religiosity and risk taking. As expected, among those primed with God, risk taking 
reduced when moral injunctions were evoked, F(1, 138) = 10.74, p = .001, η = .07, 
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but among those primed with Fairy, no differences in risk taking were observed, F(1, 
138) = .98, p = .33, η = .007.  
Discussion 
When moral injunctions against risk taking were absent, participants took 
more risks, but when moral injunctions against risk taking were invoked, the pattern 
was completely opposite. The findings provide evidence that the discrepancy between 
the findings of survey literature and mine could possibly be due to an inherent moral 
component often implicated in survey literature.  
Critics, however, could argue for an alternative interpretation: morality need 
not be implicated but instead, the manipulation of moral injunction may have been 
confounded with self-relevancy. In BART, participants were not subjected to losses 
(in the strictest sense of the word) because they did not lose anything that did not 
belong to them in the first place. When there is no loss to the self, people take more 
risks when reminded of God. Conversely, when there is some loss to the self (i.e., 
making participants believe that the BART predicts self-relevant consequences), 
participants took less risk when reminded of God. This reasoning may be further 
bolstered by the fact that the risk examples cited in the correlation studies above 
(unprotected sex, criminality, etc.) seem to pertain to the self losing something that it 
owns (health, freedom, etc.), and is therefore consistent with the fact that high 
religiosity correlates with lower risk taking. Hence, God reminders may serve to 
increase risk taking only if the risk being undertaken does not result in a loss to the 
self. However, this account is an unlikely alternative explanation for two reasons. One, 
it is unlikely to explain why individuals who were intrinsically oriented towards 
religion took more risks when morality was not implicated in Study 1. More 
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importantly, in this study, participants in the neutral moral injunction condition were 
presented with negative self-relevant but amoral implications of BART (health 
consequences of high water intake). Hence, in both moral injunction conditions, the 
negative implications clearly pertained to the self. 
We thus conclude that perhaps risk taking domains conceptualized and 
measured in previous survey literature may have been biased towards those that have 
an inherent moral content (e.g., criminality). Future studies that seek to correlate 
religiosity and risk taking should sample risks from a greater variety of domains 
(Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2006), including domains that are normally regarded as moral 
(e.g., risking one’s life to save others), immoral (e.g., unprotected casual sex) or 
amoral (e.g., financial investments). 
Note that I do not imply that the effect of God primes on risk taking is specific 
to monetary risk taking. Rather, the point is that the effect of God primes on risk 
taking depends on whether the domain of risk taking involves a moral content or not. 
Indeed, the BART was originally created as a measure of general risk propensity 
(Lejuez et al., 2002) and it has been found to correlate with a wide range of risk taking 
behaviors such as substance use (Hopko et al., 2006; Skeel, Pilarski, Pytlak, & 
Neudecker, 2008), driving without the use of seatbelts (Lejuez et al., 2003), and 
unsafe sex (Lejuez, Simmons, Aklin, Daughters, & Dvir, 2004). Furthermore, the 
reward for taking risks in BART was money, and this feature was exploited when 
manipulating moral injunctions. The implication is that if the reward was course 
credits, for example, and moral injunctions against earning course credits were 
invoked (―participants should intrinsically want to take part in psychological studies 
for the good of science‖), the same pattern of results should also be expected.  
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In addition, despite including a more general measure of trait religiosity, no 
evidence of moderation emerged. It is possible that there could still other untapped 
facets of religiosity to be tested. However, it could also be the case that religiosity 
does not moderate the effect of God primes on risk taking. 
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Chapter 5: General discussion 
Various psychological models of religion (Kay et al., 2009; Freud, 1927) have 
emphasized the role of psychological control in religion. Independently, a heightened 
sense of control has often been implicated in risk taking behaviors. Building on these 
theoretical foundations, I hypothesized that God primes should increase individuals’ 
sense of psychological control, which in turn should lead people to be more 
venturesome.  
Indeed, in three studies reported here, God-related primes increased actual risk 
taking behaviours. In Study 1, people subliminally primed with the word God took 
greater risks compared to people primed with a neutral word or the word Dad. The 
results indicated that it is unlikely that the effects were due to co-activated father 
schema or a sense of security associated with an attachment figure because activating 
people’s relational schemas of their fathers (using the prime Dad) did not produce the 
same increase in risk taking.  
If God primes temporarily boost one’s sense of psychological control which in 
turn lead to greater risk taking, then negating a sense of psychological control should 
attenuate risk taking among those exposed to God primes. Consistent with this 
proposition, Study 2 found that when people were deliberately made to feel low in 
control after exposure to a supraliminal God prime presented as words on an 
innocuous folder, people’s sense of control were disabled and this led to a significant 
decrease in risk taking. In fact, this group of people performed no differently than 
those who were not exposed to God primes. Hence, the current evidence suggests that 
the enhancing effect of God primes on risk taking is likely due to an increased in a 
sense of control.  
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Admittedly, this is only partial way to test our proposed mediation chain. 
Another experimental way to test this mediation is to further enhance psychological 
control after God primes and one should expect risk taking to further increase above 
and beyond just being primed with God alone. A third way is to construct a statistical 
mediation model with sense of psychological control as one of the measured variables.  
But note that any single approach is unlikely to provide a complete picture of 
causality as scholars have noted that convincing evidence for causal pathways often 
requires a multi-pronged approach (Green, Ha, & Bullock, 2010).  
Our main results seem to contradict some survey research that have found a 
negative correlation between religiosity and risk taking behaviors, which suggests that 
God primes, in fact, should lead to lower risk taking. I argued that these research have 
sampled risk taking from domains inherently implicated as immoral (e.g., criminal 
behaviors, casual unprotected sex, etc.). When morality was taken into consideration, 
the inconsistency between past research and the current is resolved. Specifically, in 
Study 3, when moral injunctions against risk taking were made salient by making 
participants feel that taking risks was reflective of their moral self, the main effect was 
reversed. This suggests that future correlation research may benefit by sampling risk 
taking behaviors from a wider domain when correlating with religiosity. 
It may seem intuitive that the highly religious people would be most affected 
by God primes. However, despite using several measures to capture religiosity 
(intrinsic-extrinsic religiosity scale, Study 1; social axioms religiosity subscale, Study 
2; general trait religiosity, Study 3), religiosity did not moderate the effects of God 
primes on risk taking. It is unlikely that the null findings were a result of poorly 
conceived measures of religiosity given the variety of measurements that were 
employed. Furthermore, the religiosity scales used were relevant to people of all 
42 
 
religious groups, even to those with no religious affiliations. Critics may further argue 
that the measures neglected people who believed in God and yet do not subscribe to 
any formal religion (see Zuckerman, 2008; footnote 2). However, even when analyzed 
alone, items such as ―Do you believe in God?‖ did not yield any moderating effects. 
As reviewed in the Introduction, religiosity does not always moderate God-
prime effects. Rather than explaining non-moderation of religiosity by focusing on 
specific weaknesses of each research (e.g., measurement error, other untapped facets 
of religiosity, etc.), perhaps it is more useful to consider the possibility that the 
moderation may depend on the type of behaviors being observed. According to 
Barrett (2004), our evolved mental architecture of a hyperactive agency detection 
device and theory of mind predisposes humans to believe in the existence of 
supernatural agents. Therefore, theism is natural and atheism is unnatural. Hence, 
when primed with God, people assimilate it naturally into their mental architecture 
regardless of their reported religiosity. Fundamental behaviors (increased risk taking 
as a result of increased psychological control, as investigated here), or basic 
psychological processes (e.g., attention; Chasteen et al., 2010) may not be moderated 
by religiosity, while learnt behaviours may be as a result of socialization processes 
(e.g., humor: Saroglou & Jaspard., 2001). Admittedly, this proposition is speculative. 
Nevertheless, it seems premature to expect that trait religiosity should always 
moderate effects stemming from priming God. It may be a fertile area for future 
research to explore why and when some God prime effects are moderated by 
religiosity and others not.  
Although various religiosity measures did not moderate the effect of God 
primes on risk taking, intrinsic religiosity (but not extrinsic religiosity, functionalist 
axiomatic beliefs in religion, and general measures of religiosity), predicted risk 
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taking in Study 1, whereby more intrinsically oriented individuals took greater risks. 
This finding complements my theoretical argument that intrinsically oriented 
individuals may chronically feel a higher sense of control because of their religious 
beliefs and hence showed a greater tendency to take risks.  
Specificity of God primes 
The concept of God is related to many other concepts such as religion, 
supernatural figures, morality, etc. Past research has often made been unclear about 
what exactly was primed because other concepts (e.g., religion, ancestors, spirits, 
holiness) related to God were often deliberately primed within the same experimental 
setup. In this thesis, the intention was to activate the relational schema of God and 
hence, only God was primed. The paradigm adopted here—exposing people with the 
word God—resembles past research on activating relational schemas, such as being 
exposed to a photograph of the relationship figure (e.g., Baldwin et al., 1992), being 
exposed to a name of a significant other (Andersen, Glassman, & Gold, 1998) and 
writing a description of a significant other (Shah & Kruglanski, 2003). The effect of 
God primes were then compared with other primes (dad, water, and fairies), thereby 
ruling out several alternative explanations. Although it is possible God primes may 
activate father schemas and attachment-related sense of security, Study 1 indicated 
that the effects of God primes cannot be explained by father schemas and attachment 
concepts alone. Furthermore, in Study 3, by comparing the effects of God primes with 
fairy primes, it lends support to the idea that the results were not just due to any 
supernatural figure, but a rather specific one—God.  
Critics may highlight that the word ―God‖ reflects a Christian-oriented bias 
and may thus pose a concern to my sample of religiously diverse participants (see 
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Table 1). This concern has some validity because in some religions, the relevant 
deities are usually referred differently, such as ―Allah‖ in Islam, or ―Guan Yin‖ in 
Taoism, rather than ―God‖ per se. Furthermore, polytheistic faiths (e.g., Buddhism, 
Taoism, Hinduism, etc.) assume the existence of many gods. It is likely that the 
results will differ when individuals are primed with ―Allah‖ because priming ―Allah‖ 
would likely affect only individuals (e.g., Muslims) who have knowledge of Islam. 
However, I argue that the way individuals cognitively represent their deities should be 
the same across all faiths. That is, regardless of how one addresses his or her divine 
deity, the cognitive representation of that deity is likely to be a superordinate abstract 
category. Therefore, it is unsurprising that priming ―God‖ had effects on risk taking 
across people with different religious affiliations.  
One alternative explanation was not ruled out empirically and deserves greater 
scrutiny here. Critics may argue that instead of priming a relational schema of God 
and activating its psychological presence, God primes co-activated religions concepts, 
which then influenced risk taking in an ideomotor-action way (Bargh, 1994). While it 
may be true that priming God did activate religion concepts, it is unlikely that any 
activated religion concepts in turn drove risk taking behaviors. This is because people 
associate more religion with having an attenuating effect on risk taking, as various 
survey studies have suggested (Abar et al., 2009; Diaz, 2000; Hoffman & Miller, 
1995; Kerestes et al., 2004; McNamara et al., 2010; Poulson et al., 1998; Sinha et al., 
2007). Therefore, if the co-activation account is true, then priming God should have 
decreased, not increased, risk taking. Future research may seek to rule out this 
alternative explanation empirically by comparing God primes with religion primes, 
for example, with a folder titled ―The Nature of Religion‖. Even though God and 
religion have much in common, teasing apart the influence of religion from that of 
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God in this and future studies priming God may lead to new insights. A relational 
schema approach in understanding the effects of God primes may, for example, lead 
to new directions in clinical interventions (West, 2000), and a better understanding of 
religion-inspired behavior towards others (e.g., terrorism; Victoroff & Kruglanski, 
2009) or self (e.g., self-mortification; Glucklich, 2000). 
What do the findings with subliminal versus supraliminal primes 
imply?  
Religion, like many other topics examined in social psychology (e.g., 
prejudice), is a topic that is personal and sensitive in nature. The preponderance of 
self-report methods used in studying the social effects of religion (Batson, 1986) may 
be especially prone to social desirability responding, especially since risk taking is a 
topic that often has negative connotations with deviance and recklessness (Arnett, 
1992). The use of subliminal and supraliminal God primes avoids this problem as one 
does not need to be aware of the primes and that the primes need not be visible or 
conscious for the effects to occur. This also implies that people can be unconsciously 
influenced by God-related objects. Furthermore, the stack of papers used to prime 
God (Study 3) are good representations of these daily religion objects as they 
resemble common objects found in daily life like books, posters, and billboards. 
Given that religious representations are so prominent and ubiquitous, it may be 
fruitful to examine what other effects may result from the activation of God concepts.  
On a broader issue, this research suggests an interpretation of the functions of 
religious artefacts (such as amulets) or any object imbued with religious significance. 
Unlike protective parents or supportive spouses whose physical presence is 
undeniable, supernatural divine figures only have a psychological presence; to my 
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knowledge, there have been no confirmatory sightings of any supernatural figures. It 
is through the physical embodiment of the divine that religious artefacts exert their 
effects. In my experiments, it was not the case that the prime used was a blatant 
amulet or an object (e.g., a crucifix) with strong religious associations; on the contrary, 
merely presenting an innocuous and mundane stimulus (i.e., printing ―The Nature of 
God‖ on a stack of papers placed in a corner) was enough to generate the predicted 
effects on psychological safety in God. One could extend these findings and argue 
that in daily life, formal religious symbols should have even greater effects than our 
primes.  
What else can God primes affect? 
Religion has great impact on humanity. More specific to this research, God as 
a representative agent of religion, can exert powerful effects at the level of the 
individual. This theme resonates closely with observations around the world, and also 
with experimental studies (e.g., Bushman, Ridge, Das, Key, & Busath, 2007). Appeals 
to God (more so than religion per se) often provide an additional impetus to act. It is 
widely known that ex-US President George W. Bush received an apparent mandate 
from God that led to his decision to launch the military campaign in Iraq (MacAskill, 
2005), and experimentally, it has been shown that sanctified violence increases actual 
aggression, even towards unrelated people (Bushman et al., 2007). Given that God 
and religion have widespread influences on humanity, perhaps future research can 
examine what other effects God primes exert. For example, the increase in 
psychological control as a result of being primed with God may have other 
downstream consequences, particularly those involved in self-regulation (McCullough 
& Willoughby, 2009). 
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Coda: Implications to Singapore 
While conceptualizing Study 3, the Straits Times published an article on the 
space crunch faced by some religious groups in finding venues big enough to hold 
their services (Lee, 2010). It was reported that one religious group had intentions to 
hold some of its services near a major casino. By definition, gambling involves risks. 
Studies 1 and 2 would suggest that such a move would have unintended consequences 
of increasing gambling behaviour among attendees. If that were to happen, or perhaps 
even before it were to happen, one (preventive) solution is for religious leaders to 
invoke moral injunctions against gambling during their services. As Study 3 
demonstrated, invoking moral injunctions when people are primed with God can have 




1. This caption accompanied a photograph titled ―Leap of faith‖ taken by Stephan 
Waterfall in Mount Snowdonia, Northern Wales, in 2007. The photograph is not 
included in this thesis because of copyright reasons. It can be found on 
http://www.watchthisspace.ca/pixelpost/index.php?showimage=332 
2. In recent decades, anthropologists of religion such as Zuckerman (2008) have 
noted a rise in the number of people, particularly in Western Europe, who 
proclaim to have a religion but, at the same time, profess to not believe in God 
when further probed. Sociologists have termed this ―cultural religion‖, or simply, 
partaking in religion as part of a cultural tradition without believing in the 
supernatural elements.  
3. The compensatory control model of religion views religion as an external source 
of control (deriving a sense of control from God) and not as a source of external 
control (relegating a sense of control to God). 
4. The designation of base groups is arbitrary, though it is typically coded as 0 
(Aiken & West, 1993). But in this case, because there are one experimental and 
two comparison groups, it is easier to interpret the regression weights if the 
experimental group (God condition) is coded as 0. It is not necessary to create 
orthogonal (independent) weights for this set of dummy codes because the 
possible redundancy due to correlated dummy codes will be corrected by multiple 
regression. 
5. The results remain unchanged even when the analyses were combined into one 
hierarchical regression model but the presentation would be unnecessarily more 
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complicated because additional interaction terms (e.g., Prime × IR × ER, IR × ER) 
have to be included. 
6. This is not to say that we derive morality from religion. See Dawkins (2007) and 
Boyer (2001) for a discussion. 
7. The reason why any domain (e.g., eating dog meat) has an inherent moral 
implication is beyond the scope of this research. Interested readers may refer to 
Haidt, Koller, & Dias (1993) and Krebs (2008) for social-cultural and 




Table 1. Religious Affiliation of Participants in Studies 1, 2 and 3. 
 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Aggregate 
No religion 65 (37.8%) 47 (33.3%) 43 (28.9%) 155 (33.8%) 
Buddhist 34 (19.8%) 26 (18.4%) 27 (18.1%) 87 (19%) 
Taoist 7 (4.1%) 8 (5.7%) 9 (6%) 24 (5.2%) 
Christian 44 (25.6%) 30 (21.3%) 44 (29.5%) 118 (25.8%) 
Catholic 10 (5.8%) 6 (4.3%) 12 (8/1%) 28 (6.1%) 
Muslim 6 (3.5%) 8 (5.7) 6 (4%) 20 (4.4%) 
Hindu 4 (2.3%) 11 (7.8%) 3 (2%) 18 (3.9%) 
Others 2 (1.2%) 1 (0.7%) 5 (3.3%) 8 (1.7%) 
Note: The category ―Others‖ consists of people who proclaim believing in God but 
not within the ―mainstream‖ religions (e.g., Universal Consciousness, Flying 








Table 2. Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Risk Taking 
from Prime and Centered Intrinsic Religiosity (IR), Study 1. 
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Note. God condition was designated as the base category, coded as 0. In D1, the Water 





Table 3. Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Risk Taking 
from Prime and Extrinsic Religiosity (ER), Study 1. 
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Note. God condition was designated as the base category, coded as 0. In D1, the Water 
condition was coded as 1; in D2, the Dad condition was coded as 1; ER = extrinsic 
religiosity.   
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Table 4. Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Risk Taking 
from Prime and Social Axiom Religiosity Subscale, Study 2. 








































Note. The water condition was designated as the base category, coded as 0.   
54 
 
Table 5. Hierarchical Regression Analyses Predicting Risk Taking 
from Prime, Moral Injuction, and Religiosity, Study 3. 
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Note. The dummy codings for Prime were God = 1, Fairy = 0, and for Moral 








Fig. 2. Pattern of means of primes and psychological control on 








Fig. 3. Pattern of means of primes and moral injunction on risk 
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